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Fiduciary Duty and the Ex Officio
Conundrum in Corporate Governance:
The Troublesome Murkiness of the
Gubernatorial Trustee's Obligations
Salar Ghahramani*
Should governors serve on the boards of incorporated universities as
ex officio members? This article examines the question by
considering the expeience of Pennnsylvania State University and
analyzes the implications of governors serving on the boards of state-
aided corporations by focusing on the fiduciary responsibilities of
directors under corporate law. The article concludes that the current
statutory framework needs reconsideration and asserts that while
there is no question that the state's public interests should trump an
institution's "private" interests, it is the state that has chartered the
corporation for the promotion of a public good (education) and has
appointed the governor to guard the institution's best interests as one
of its directors. Accordingly, if the ex officio director is in a position
where he may not be able to serve the corporation's interests as a
fiduciary, the law must require him to step down from the board, as
the current paradigm's constant tensions between public governance
political objectives and private corporate governance principles, as
defined by centuries of fiduciary law, cannot be sustained.
1. INTRODUCTION
In November of 2011, the Pennsylvania State University ("Penn
State") became the subject of a nationwide scandal, triggered by
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Policy at the Pennsylvania State University, Abington, and the Founding Co-Chair of the
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International Court of Justice at The Hague. The author would like to express his sincere
gratitude to HBL~s excellent staff for their thorough and thoughtful assistance as well as to Mr.
John Keller, Esq., for helping find a key primary document.
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allegations against a retired former assistant football coach, Jerry
Sandusky, accused (and later convicted) of engaging in sexual
activities with underage boys.' The grand jury investigation against
Mr. Sandusky was initiated in 2009, under the leadership of the then-
attorney general, Thomas Corbett.2 Accordingly, when Mr. Corbett
became Pennsylvania's governor in 2011, and hence a voting ex
officio3  member of Penn State's Board of Trustees,4  he had
knowledge of potentially damaging information about the university
that no other board member presumably had. Yet, despite his
fiduciary responsibilities toward the university,6 he could not disclose
the injurious information or urge his fellow trustees to take specific
action to protect the institution because grand jury laws and rules of
professional conduct prohibited him from disclosing anything related
to the ongoing criminal investigation in which he had been
instrumental when serving as attorney general.'
1. See Mark Viera, A Sex Abuse Scandal Rattl/cs Penn Stateh Football Program, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 6, 2011, at Al (providing the background of the charges); Tim Rohan, Sandusky
Gets 30 to 60 Years for Sexual Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2012, at Al (summarizing the
Sandusky trial, conviction, and sentencing).
2. Mr. Corbett served as Attorney General of Pennsylvania from 2005 until 2011. In this
capacity, his office was privy to the secret grand jury investigation information that had been
initiated in 2009. See Jo Becker, Abuse Inquiry Set Tiicky Path for a Governor, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 11, 2011, at Al (summarizing Mr. Corbett's role as Attorney General in the Sandusky
investigation).
3. Ex officio, which in Latin means "by virtue of office or position" refers to the method
by which one becomes a member of a body. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 642 (3rd ed.
1992). It is not a class of membership and is not about rights, despite the common
misconception that ex officio members are automatically nonvoting. See HENRY M. ROBERT,
ROBERT'S RULES OF ORDER 466-67 (Daniel H. Honcmann et al. eds., 10th ed. 2000).
However, the rights of ex officio members can be limited in an organization's bylaws.
Otherwise, ex officio members enjoy the same rights and privileges as all other members. Id.
4. See 24 PA. STAT. ANN. § 2533 (2013) (designating the governor as an ex officio trustee).
See also Penn. St. Univ. Charter C-2 (May 2013), available at http://www.psu.edu/
trustees/pdf/charter.pdf [hereinafter PSU Charterj (naming the Governor of the
Commonwealth, among others, as ex officio members of the Board). At Penn State, the
governor had been a voting ex officio member of the Board since the inception of the University
in 1855. However, in May of 2013, the Board amended the Charter, rendering the governor a
non-voting member. Id. See also Penn. St. Univ. Bylaws § 2.01 (a)(ii) [hereinafter PSU Bylaws]
(denoting the roles of ex officio members).
5. Due to the secret nature of grand juries, none of the witnesses or others involved in the
process could have legally briefed members of the Penn State Board of Trustees. There is no
indication that any board member had specific knowledge of the proceedings that he or she had
attained through other channels.
6. See PSU Bylaws, supra note 4, at § 8.07 (noting that the board members have a
fiduciary duty toward the university). See also infra Part III and Part VI (discussing,
respectively, nonprofit board members' fiduciary responsibilities in general and Pennsylvania
statutory requirements in particular).
7. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4549 (2013) (persons involved in the grand jury proceedings
"shall be sworn to secrecy, and shall be in contempt of court if they reveal any information
which they are sworn to keep secret"); 234 PA. CODE § 2.231 (2013) ("All persons who are to be
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Unrelated to the scandal, Governor Corbett's 2011 annual
budget proposal to the Pennsylvania legislature had recommended
severe funding cuts to the Commonwealth System of Higher
Education ("CSHE"), of which Penn State and three other
universities (Lincoln University, Temple University, and the
University of Pittsburgh) are members.' At all four state-related
institutions,9 the governor retains a special role: At Lincoln, and,
until May of 2013, at Penn State, the governor has been a voting ex
officio member of the boards of trustees."> At Temple and
Pittsburgh, the governor is a nonvoting ex officio trustee.' At all
four universities, the governor also appoints several of the other
trustees. 12 Yet, despite his fiduciary obligations toward these
present while the grand jury is in session shall be identified in the record, shall be sworn to
secrecy as provided in these rules, and shall not disclose any information pertaining to the grand
jury except as provided by law.").
8. See Eleanor Chute & Bill Schackner, Proposed Education Cuts Termed "Catastrophic,"
PITT. POST-GAZETTE (Mar. 29, 2011), http://www.post-gazette.com/stories/local/state/proposed-
education-cuts-termed-catastrophic-211559 (highlighting that the proposal included cutting the
annual state support of state-owned and state-supported higher education institutions by more
than fifty percent).
9. Pennsylvania statutes categorize the four universities as "state-related." See 10 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 374 (2013); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 20.302 (2013); 24 PA. CONS. STAT. § 20-2001-C
(2013). State-related universities are private corporations that are aided by the state, may be
considered the instrumentalities of the state, but are not owned by the state. Sec, e.g., 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 20.302 (2013) (making the distinction between "state-related" and "state-owned"
institutions of higher education in Pennsylvania); 24 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2510-2 (2013)
(designating Temple University as a state-related university and as "an instrumentality of the
Commonwealth"); 24 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 2510-2503 (2013) (declaring that the "[corporation
for Penn State is a wholly controlled affiliate of the Board of Trustees of The Pennsylvania State
University, a State-related university and an instrumentality of the Commonwealth").
10. See Lincoln Univ. Bylaws, art. II, § 2(A) (noting that the ex officio members "shall be
voting members" of the Board); see also PSU Bylaws supra note 4 and accompanying text
(highlighting the transformation of the governor's role on the board from voting ex officio to
nonvoting ex officio).
11. Sc Temple Univ. Bylaws, art. IV, § 4.1(A) ("[TIhe Governor of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, the Secretary of Education of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and the
Mayor of the City of Philadelphia ... shall be non-voting, Ex-Officio Trustees . . . . An Ex-
Officio Trustee and an Honorary Life Trustee shall have the privilege of attending Board
meetings and participating in its deliberations, but shall not have a vote in Board decisions.")
(emphasis added); Univ. of Pitt. Governance: Bd. of Trs, available at http://www.provost.
pitt.edu/handbook/ch1-gov-trustees.htm (last updated July 19, 2012) ("The Board of Trustees
includes the Governor of Pennsylvania, the Secretary of Education, and the Mayor of the City
of Pittsburgh, all three of whom are non-voting, ex officio members.").
12. At Penn State, the governor appoints six trustees to the board (see PSU Bylaws, supra
note 4, at C-2). At Lincoln, the governor appoints four members to the Board, subject to a two-
thirds advice and consent of the Pennsylvania Senate. See Lincoln Univ. Bylaws, supra note 10,
at art. II, § 2(B). At Temple, the governor appointed four of the trustees See Temple Univ.
Bd. of Trs., available at http://www.temple.edu/secretary/trustees.htm (last updated Jan. 1,
2013). At the University of Pittsburgh, the governor appoints four of the trustees (see Univ. of
Pitt. Governance, supra note 11).
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institutions as their director,13 the governor initiated significant
budget cuts that could adversely affect the organizations' viability and
their missions.
With this background, the present article analyzes the
implications of governors serving on the boards of trustees of quasi-
public universities such as Penn State,14 a gubernatorial prerogative
that is by no means unique to Pennsylvania." With a focus on the
fiduciary responsibilities of directors under corporate law," this
article proceeds according to the following parts: Part II examines
the historical roots of the corporate model of governance in
American higher education. 7 Part III presents an overview of
13. As is the norm in nonprofit corporate governance, this article will use the terms
"trustee" and "director" interchangeably.
14. While chartered as private corporations, the state-related universities are essentially
quasi-public institutions. See Isaacs v. Bd. of Trs. of Temple Univ., 385 F. Supp. 473, 476 (E.D.
Pa. 1974) ("'In essence, the Temple University-Commonwealth Act establishes a working
partnership between the University and the State. Temple retains its private corporate identity,
but the Commonwealth shares in the control of the institution through the appointment of one-
third of Temple's Board of Trustees and through the financial accountability provisions written
into the Act.' The Act thus created an 'organic relationship between Temple University and the
Commonwealth' that is 'the same as that between the Commonwealth and the Pennsylvania
State University. Both of these institutions, while private in corporate identity, are invested
with a quasi-public character and charged with certain public responsibilities, obligations and
commitment.") (quoting REP. OF THE HIGHER EDUC. COMM. COMMONWEALTH OF PA. H.R.
(1965-1966)) (emphasis added).
15. The author is unaware of any public or quasi-public university or state university system
that does not carve out a special role for the governor. This gubernatorial prerogative may be
granted by public law and incorporated into the university charter. See, e.g., PSU Charter,
supra note 4, at C-2 & C-3 (citing statutes and court decrees that confer cx officio membership
on the board and accord the Pennsylvania governor the authority to appoint other members to
Penn State's board of trustees). For a general overview of the role of public officials on
university boards, sec generally, Robert C. Lowry, Governmental Structure, Trustee Selection,
and Public University Prices and Spending. Multiple Means to Similar Ends, 45 AM. J. POL. ScI.
845, 849 (2001) (noting that nationwide "over eighty percent of the trustees on public university
governing boards are selected by elected officials or popular election, and many boards also
include state government officials who serve ex officio").
16. Historically, the nonprofit corporation trustees' fiduciary duties were defined by the
strictest standard of care rooted in trust law. For the most part, legislatures and courts have
replaced these traditional precepts with the less restrictive corporate governance principles and
directorial duties found in the for-profit sector. See Denise Ping Lee, The Business Judgment
Rule: Should It Protect Nonprofit Directors?, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 925, 926 (2003).
Nonetheless, trust and corporate law both impose, at the very least, "nonwaivable obligations of
loyalty and the good faith exercise of care." Evelyn Brody, The Board of Nonprofit
Organizations: Puzzling Through the Gaps Between Law and Practice, 76 FORDHAM L. REV.
521, 527 (2007).
17. The predominant legal form for a modern American university is the corporation
model. See infra Part II. As such, the "governance" issues discussed in this paper focus on the
university's corporate governance, i.e., the relationship between the board of trustees and the
university itself, rather than the more common discussion in academia revolving around the
notions of shared governance-power-sharing mechanisms among faculty, the administration,
and the board.
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fiduciary obligations in nonprofit corporations and analyzes duties of
care, loyalty, and obedience as the three pillars of nonprofit corporate
governance as well as the applicability of the business judgment rule
in assessing nonprofit directorial performance. Part IV reviews the
mechanisms available to the state attorneys general and others
interested in enforcing nonprofit directorial obligations. Part V
provides specific examples of enforcement of duties as applied to
university fiduciaries. Part VI critiques the gubernatorial-trustee
model through its examination of Penn State's experience and offers
specific recommendations as potential solutions to the inherent
predicaments caused by the model. Part VII concludes.
II. THE CORPORATE UNIVERSITY
A. HISTORY
The principal legal structure for most-if not all-American
universities is the corporation, a fictitious person with rights and
responsibilities identical to for-profit entities, overseen by a board of
directors.'" This adoption of the corporate model of governance at
colleges and universities dates back to the founding of Harvard and
Yale, two of the oldest corporations within the English legal
tradition." (Harvard, established in 1636 and chartered in 1650,20
claims to be "the oldest corporation in the Western Hemisphere.") 2 1
The corporate model is not unique to private universities, as state-
owned and state-related colleges and universities have also espoused
the form,22 despite the absence of any legal requirement for them to
do so and the availability of other governance models, which they
have not sought.23
18. See Benjamin E. Hermalin, Higher Education Boards of Trustecs, in GOVERNING
ACADEMIA 28 (Ronald G. Ehrenberg ed., 2004).
19. See id.
20. Historical Facts, HARVARD UNIV. ARCHIVES, http://www.harvard.edu/historical-facts
(last visited Sept. 27, 2013).
21. President and Fellows, HARVARD CORP., http://www.harvard.edu/harvard-corporation
(last visited Sept. 27, 2013).
22. See, e.g., 24 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 20-2002-A, 20-2003-A (2013) (the enabling legislation
for the Pennsylvania State System of Higher Education establishing the fourteen-member state-
owned university system as "a body corporate and politic constituting a public corporation and
government instrumentality" having "perpetual existence as a corporation"). See also infra Part
VI (providing the incorporation details of the state-related Penn State University).
23. See Hermalin, supra note 18, at 28-29 (stating that "a state university could easily be
overseen by civil service bureaucrats in some state agency of higher education, similar to the
way many states oversee grade K through 12 education" or universities could adopt the
governance systems of European institutions or service academies such as West Point).
Professor Hermalin argues that the fact that American universities have not sought alternatives
suggests that the corporate governance model by most universities probably works. Id.
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Incidentally, the cornerstone of American corporate law was laid
by a lawsuit in which a college-determined to protect its pre-
Republic private corporate charter from state overreaching-was the
plaintiff. In Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward,4 the
Supreme Court had to decide whether the New Hampshire
legislature's attempt to make Dartmouth public, thereby rendering
the original charter granted by King George III void, was legal. The
Court held for Dartmouth, with the Justices recognizing the original
charter to have been a contract. Chief Justice Marshall famously
noted that a corporation is "an artificial being, invisible, intangible,
and existing only in contemplation of law. Being the mere creation of
law, it possesses only those properties which the charter of its creation
confers upon it, either expressly, or as incidental to its very
existence." 25 The case played "a key role in the rise of the American
business corporation," as it reaffirmed the sanctity of contracts
under the U.S. Constitution.27
This utilization of the corporate model in higher education,
particularly as related to the role of the board in governing the
university, is unique to the United States and Canada.28 Other
governing structures in the world have included university control by
ministries of higher education,2 9 faculty guilds (as in Oxford and
Cambridge until the mid-nineteenth century, when the system was
reformed by Royal Commissions),30 or student guilds, the original
governance form of Bologna University, the oldest university in the
Western world, where:
[t]he students ruled through what might be called in loco
parentis rules dominating the professors . . . . Faculty
members had no vote. They had to swear an oath of
allegiance to their student rulers. They were subject to
expulsion by the students. They could not leave campus,
even for one day, without permission. When they did leave,
they had to deposit a sum of money to guarantee their return.
Punctuality at lectures was enforced with extreme vigor.
Professors were fined for what were deemed "poor"
lectures.3'
In contrast, American colleges and universities were (and
24. 17 U.S. 518 (1819).
25. Id. at 636.
26. R. Kent Newmyer, John Marshall as a Transitional Jurist: Dartmouth College v.
Woodward and the Limits of Omniscient Judging, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1665, 1666 (2000).
27. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1 (Contract Clause).
28. CLARK KERR & MARION GADE, THE GUARDIANS: BOARDS OF TRUSTEES OF
AMERICAN COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES 12 (1989).
29. Id. at 10.
30. Id.
31. KERR & GADE, supra note 28, at 11.
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continue to be) board driven. The historical dichotomy between the
American and European systems of governance is perhaps best
explained by historians Richard Hofstadter and Wilson Smith who
note:
The European universities had been founded by groups of
mature scholars; the American colleges were founded by
their communities; and since they did not soon develop the
mature scholars possessed from the beginning by their
European predecessors but were staffed instead for
generations mainly by young and transient tutors, the
community leaders were reluctant to drop their reins of
control.
It is in this context that one can grasp the roots of the
community's oversight of universities, at times vis-A-vis the state.
B. STATE OVERSIGHT
The government's support of higher education in the United
States predates the nation itself, beginning with the allocation of
public resources to primarily church-chartered institutions in the form
of granting public lands and authorizing lotteries to benefit the
college or university.33 The notion of governors serving as university
trustees also goes back to pre-Revolutionary times. The governor of
New Hampshire, for instance, held an ex officio position on
Dartmouth's board by prescription of the college's original royal
charter,3 4 and the charter of Rutgers University, originally called
Queen's College and created by George III in 1766, provided "for the
incorporation of the Trustees in perpetuity . . . with appropriate
corporate powers ... [consisting of] the Governor or Commander-in-
Chief, the President of the Council, the Chief Justice and the
Attorney-General of the colony for the time being" and others.35
The creation of truly public institutions began in the latter part of
the eighteenth century, with the institutions receiving direct subsidies
from the state.36 For decades, the state granted substantial autonomy
to the institutions' boards of trustees and thus sought modest to no
control over the institutions. However, well into the nineteenth
32. 1 AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 3 (Richard
Hofstadter & Wilson Smith eds., 1961).
33. Donald E. Heller, State Oversight of Acadcmia, in GOVERNING ACADEMIA 49, 50
(Ronald G. Ehrenberg ed., 2004).
34. James 0. Freedman, Prcsidents and Trustees, in GOVERNING ACADEMIA 9, 11 (Ronald
G. Ehrenberg ed., 2004).
35. See Trs. of Rutgers Coll. v. Richman, 125 A.2d 10, 13-19 (N.J. Ch. 1956) (providing a
thorough history of Rutgers).
36. Heller, spra note 33, at 50.
37. Id.
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century, several legislatures sought greater control of the public
* 38institutions by inserting ex officio state-appointed trustees.
C. THE TRUSTEES
The university boards of trustees and for-profit boards of
directors are derived from the same legal tradition. University
boards have been called "the guardians" and, similar to the board
members of for-profit corporations, trustees of universities are
understood to have fiduciary duties of care and loyalty.41 On the
responsibilities of university trustees, A. Lawrence Lowell, Harvard's
president from 1909 to 1933, once wrote: "The trustees, or whatever
the members of the governing body may be called, although vested
with the legal title to the property, are not the representatives of
private owners, for there are none. They are custodians, holding the
property in trust to promote the objects of the institution." 42
Similarly, Louis Heilbron, the first chair of the Board of Trustees
of the California State Colleges (now universities), noted: "The key
part of the trustee's title is (or should be) the word trust. He holds
something valuable in trust-the classrooms, the libraries . . . the
institution itself-for high purposes and benefits, not for himself, but
for others." 43
But how can these trustees' exact duties be assessed and
evaluated, and what criteria should be used? Unlike the for-profit
corporate boards, whose main objective is to increase shareholder
value, the mission-based nonprofit universities must satisfy different
sets of constituencies, including students, employees, alumni, donors,
public officials, and society at large. This dichotomy in purpose may
not be well-understood by some board members. In fact, as one
former university president has noted, there is a "tendency to conflate
the 'bottom-line' fiduciary responsibility of a for-profit corporate
director with the mission-oriented responsibility of a university." 4 4
The complexities of university governance render the precise
38. Heller, supra not 33, at 50.
39. Sec Hermalin, supra note 18, at 28.
40. KERR & GADE, supra note 28, at 12.
41. Freedman, supra note 34, at 17. See also Carter G. Bishop, The Deontological
Sgnificance of Nonprofit Corporate Governance Standards: A Fiduciary Duly of Carc Without
a Remedy, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 701, 713 (2008) ("State law nonprofit corporate board
governance responsibilities are essentially the same as those that apply to the for-profit
corporate director.").
42. JAMES BAUGHMAN, TRUSTEES, TRUSTEESHIP, AND THE PUBLIC GOOD 16 (1987).
43. LOuIS HEILBRON, THE COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY TRUSTEE: A VIEW FROM THE
BOARD RooM 3 (1973).
44. Freedman, supra note 34, at 18.
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discernment of what a university trustee's responsibilities entail an
intricate task. In general, university board members have at least the
following duties toward the university:
* protecting the welfare of the individual institution and its
missions;45
* protecting the institution's autonomy from external economic
and political forces; 46
* protecting the academic freedom of the institution's
members;47
* ensuring adequate resources; 48 and
* considering the public welfare.49
Of course, any assessment of university boards' performance
utilizing these criteria would have to confront the problem of
defining, and pricing, the board's objectives-not a simple endeavor.
For instance, should the board's performance be based on evaluating
teaching effectiveness? Enrollments? Enhanced educational quality?
Reputation? Revenue? Research and innovation? Accessibility?
Societal impact? The fact that these criteria may at times be
competing objectives can complicate the evaluation of the board's
performance. For instance, achieving higher enrollment at the
expense of reducing admissions standards may diminish educational
quality and university reputation, and increasing class sizes to boost
income may stifle teaching effectiveness. 0
Despite the potential collision of objectives, so long as the board
members act in good faith and with sound judgment, their decisions
affecting the university are protected by the business judgment rule."
For this reason, as well as the fact that there are serious challenges
associated with enforcing the directorial obligations of nonprofit
corporations in general, and university directors in particular,"
45. KERR & GADE, supra note 28, at 12.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Richard T. Ingram, Responsibilitics of the Governing Board, in GOVERNING PUBLIC
COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES: A HANDBOOK FOR TRUSTEES, CHIEF EXECUTIVES, AND
OTHER CAMPUS LEADERS 93, 102 (Richard T. Ingram ed., 1993).
49. KERR & GADE, supra note 28.
50. These problems are not necessarily unique to a university, as for-profit corporations
may also be at the mercy of contending objectives. Cost-cutting to generate short-term revenue
may cause diminished product quality and long-term reputational problems for the firm.
Nonetheless, it is still the "profit" by which a corporation's performance is evaluated.
51. See infra Part II.C (discussing the business judgment rule and its applicability to
nonprofits).
52. See infra Part IV.A (noting how asserting the obligations of nonprofit directors largely
falls on the state attorneys general whose charitable enforcement divisions are often
understaffed to take meaningful action against alleged cases of fiduciary violations).
53. See infra Parts IV.B and IV.C (highlighting the challenges inherent in private
enforcement of directorial duties at universities given the limitations imposed by the special
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courts have seldom been involved in addressing the responsibilities of
the board toward the university. With this backdrop, the next section
examines the legal duties of nonprofit corporate directors under
fiduciary law.
III. FIDUCIARY DUTY IN NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS
A. OVERVIEW
A fiduciary is one who "owes to another the duties of good faith,
trust, confidence, and candor."5 4 The word itself is rooted in the
Latin terms fides (from which confidential derives)," which means
faith," representing the conscience of the people57 and their trust.
"Fiducia" 9 means a "position of trust"a or "in trust. Historians
trace the concept to the Romans, and, in Anglo-American law, to the
rise of trusts during the Middle Ages. 62 As one scholar has observed,
the "rhetoric of fiduciary obligation permeates western political
theory, from Cicero's discourses On Moral Obligation, to Locke's
Two Treatises of Government, to the seminal Federalist Papers."6 1
Throughout the centuries, Anglo-American law has extended the
fiduciary concept to include a sequence of relations. 4 In a case
addressing fiduciary responsibilities, Judge Cardozo noted:
Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for
those acting at arm's length, are forbidden to those bound by
fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something stricter than the
morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the
punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard
of behavior. As to this there has developed a tradition that is
unbending and inveterate . . . .
interest doctrine and the difficulties associated with bringing derivative action).
54. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 640 (7th ed. 1999) [hercinafter Black'sj.
55. Sce DAVID COWAN BAYNE, THE PHILOSOPHY OF CORPORATE CONTROL: A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF FIDUCIARY DUTY 36 (1986); THE BARNHART DICTIONARY OF
ETYMOLOGY 380 (Robert K. Barnhart & Sol Steinmetz eds. 1988) [hereinafter Barnhart].
56. See Black's, supra note 54.
57. HANS JULIUS WOLFF, ROMAN LAW: AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION 65, 74-75
(1951).
58. See Bayne, supra note 55, at 36-37.
59. See ERNEST VINTER, A TREATISE ON THE HISTORY AND LAW OF FIDUCIARY
RELATIONSHIP AND RESULTING TRUSTS 1 (1955).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Foundations of Administrative Law, 54 UCLA L. REv. 117,
124 (2006).
63. Id. at 123-24.
64. Id. at 126 (providing an extensive list of such relations).
65. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
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Ultimately, fiduciary duties apply to countless relationships in
almost every corner of the law, including relationships between "a
trustee and beneficiary, a guardian and ward, an agent and principal,
a lawyer and client, a member of the clergy and a parishioner, a
director and a corporation, a partner and the other 2 artners, an
employer and an employee, and a broker and client." The legal
sources of the duties are created by a wide range of federal and state
statutes and the common law. 67 The myriad of cases in a given a year
that allege fiduciary duty violations by plaintiffs make "the law of
fiduciary duty . . . by any measure an exceedingly complex and
nuanced area of the law."68 As Professors Scharffs and Welch note:
While rooted in concepts such as good faith, trust, and
confidence, the duties that courts have categorized under the
rubric of fiduciary duty are many and varied, and are often
described in very lofty terms. These duties include the duty
not to commit fraud, not to engage in self-dealing, to be loya,
obedient, diligent, and exercise good faith, to disclose
material information, and to exercise care and prudence,
among others.
The fiduciary obligations of charitable corporations are rooted in
both trust law and corporate law.70 Tax law also imposes certain
obligations on directors and trustees, primarily for the determination
of exemption status by taxing authorities." As the oldest type of
charitable organization in the United States, trusts have long been a
guiding source in nonprofit corporation law,72 a phenomenon that
66. Brett G. Scharffs & John W. Welch, An Analytic Framework for Understanding and
Evaluating the Fiduciary Duties ofEducators, 2005 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 159, 163 (2005).
67. Scharffs, supra note 66, at 163.
68. Id
69. Id. at 162.
70. See Susan N. Gary, Regulating the Management of Charities: Trust Law, Corporate
Law, and Tax Law, 21 U. HAW. L. REv. 593, 597 (1999) (exploring the roots of nonprofit
corporation law).
71. See Johnny Rex Buckles, The Federalization of the Duty of Loyalty Governing Charity
Fiduciaries Under United States Tax Law, 99 KY. L.J. 645, 653-63 (2011) (discussing how
federal tax laws essentially impose a duty of loyalty as a fundamental requirement for obtaining
and maintaining tax exempt status as a charitable entity); Thomas Lee Hazen & Lisa Love
Hazen, Duties of Nonprofit Corporate DirectorsEmphasizing Oversight Responsibiltics, 90
N.C. L. REV. 1845, 1853-54 (2012) (highlighting the 2008 amendments to IRS Form 990, which
inquire what the board's role in governing the nonprofit is, and noting that because Form 990s
are publicly available, the IRS requirements may affect the board's state law obligations since
"[sjtate attorneys general and others concerned with a nonprofit organization's operations now
have access to details about the governance structure that may bring into question the board's
role when wrongdoing occurs").
72. See GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS
AND TRUSTEES (2d rev. ed. 1991) (treating charitable trust law and charitable corporation law
interchangeably); MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS:
FEDERAL AND STATE LAW AND REGULATION 43-48 (2004) (tracing the charitable trust form
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may be attributed to the long organizational history of the trust
predating the rise of the business corporation by at least half a
millennium."
Accordingly, courts have historically struggled with deciding
what level of fiduciary obligations they should impose on corporate
charitable trustees7 4 and have, at times, relied upon the deeply-rooted
trust law traditions to address the duties owed." The charitable
corporations' common usage of the term "trustee" (a phrase
historically reserved for the overseers of trusts) rather than the word
"director" (a term generally used for for-profit corporate board
members) to refer to their oversight bodies has likely not helped
resolve the judicial uncertainty." While nonprofit corporation law
remains sparse relative to centuries of trust law decisions, the
proliferation of state statutes, aided by model laws and guidance
created by the American Bar Association and the American Law
Institute, have significantly helped distinguish charitable corporation
to pre-Republic colonial history); Henry Hansmann, The Evolving Law of Nonprofit
Organizations: Do Current Trends Make Good Policy? 39 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 807, 808
("[P]rior to the nineteenth century the law of nonprofit organizations had little definition as a
distinct subject . . . . [Miany nonprofit organizations were not incorporated but rather were
formed simply as charitable trusts, and the law of charitable trusts remained an important
source of authority for most incorporated nonprofits as well.").
73. See Rob Atkinson, Obedience as the Foundation of Fiduciary Duty, 34 J. CORP. L. 43,
64 (2008) ("In Anglo-American law, the trust as a commonly used organizational form preceded
the modern general-purpose business corporation by half a millennium at the very least.").
74. See Nina J. Crimm, A Case Study of a Private Foundation's Governance and Self-
Interested Fiduciaries Calls for Further Regulation, 50 EMORY L.J. 1093, 1133-40 (2001)
(providing a historical overview of dual fiduciary duty standards).
75. See, e.g., Holt v. College of Osteopathic Physicians & Surgeons, 394 P.2d 932, 936-37
(Cal. 1964) (treating a charitable corporation as if it were a charitable trust); Lynch v. John M.
Redfield Foundation, 9 Cal. App. 3d 293, 298 (1970) ("Members of the board of directors of [a
nonprofit[ corporation are essentially trustees."). See also Ping Lee, supra note 16, at n. 71
(providing a list of cases where charitable trust principles were applied to analyze nonprofit
corporate trustee actions).
76. See generally Evelyn Brody, Charity Governance: What's Trust Law Got to Do with
It?, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 641, 642 (2005) [hereinafter Brody, Charity Governance]:
[W]c commonly use the term "trusteeship" to describe what it is that the board of a
charity does. Indeed, directors of nonprofit corporations (at least those that are
charities) are frequently called "trustees" -either under their state law, their organic
documents, or colloquially (including such references by courts, regulators,
practitioners, and the press). The common use of the term suggests that we know
what we mean by trusteeship. Granted, in the private trust context, the notion of
trusteeship has an accepted content, but private trustees merely administer rather
than govern.
See also Gary, supra note 70, at 609 ("ID irectors of charitable corporations were often called
'trustees,' reflecting this intermingling of the trust form and the corporate form."); Thomas Lee
Hazen & Lisa Love Hazen, Punctilios and Nonprofit Corporate Governance-A
Comprehensive Look at Nonprofit Directors' Fiduciary Duties, 14 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 347, 380
(2012) [hereinafter Hazen & Hazen, Punctilios] ("References to directors as trustees continue in
current case law.").
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law from the law of charitable trusts.n It is now well-understood that
while nonprofit corporate law continues to borrow from trust law, the
fiduciary duties of the trustees of charitable corporations are
"measured under standards developed in the jurisprudence of for-
profit corporations,"" and whether actions taken by the trustees (or
directors) of a charitable corporation are legal must be in accordance
with "principles of corporate law rather the principles governing the
fiduciary relationship between trustees of a technical trust and their
trust."79
On the whole, the degree of the nonprofit corporate trustees'
fiduciary obligations range between lax and strict, depending on the
nonprofit's type.so When available, the degree of the trust expected
of the fiduciaries may also be shaped by the corporation and its
bylaws," although corporate documents may not reduce the directors'
duty of loyalty82 or duty of care "to permit a knowing violation of law,
intentional misconduct, reckless conduct, or gross negligence"" or to
"[a]bsolve a fiduciary from the obligation to act in good faith."8 4 As a
general rule, nonprofit board members must promote the
corporation's best interest, must disclose to the other members
material information that may not be known by their fellow trustees,
(although such disclosure is not required if it would "violate a duty
imposed by law, a legally enforceable obligation of confidentiality, or
a professional ethics rule"),87 and have good faith duties of care,
loyalty, and obedience toward the institution."
77. See, e.g., MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT (1952); MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT
(1964); MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT (2008); PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS.
(2005 and 2007); REV. MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT (1987).
78. Oberly v. Kirby, 592 A.2d 445, 461 (Del. 1991). See also Stcrn v. Lucy Webb Hayes
Nat'l Training Sch. for Deaconesses & Missionaries, 381 F. Supp. 1003, 1013 (D.D.C. 1974)
("The charitable corporation is a relatively new legal entity which does not fit neatly into the
established common law categories of corporation and trust . . . . [Hlowever, the modern trend
is to apply corporate rather than trust principles in determining the liability of the directors of
charitable corporations, because their functions are virtually indistinguishable from those of
their 'pure' corporate counterparts.").
79. Denckla v. Independence Found., 41 Del. Ch. 247, 193 A.2d 538, 541 (Del. 1963).
80. See, e.g., Hansmann, supra note 72, at 815-17 (highlighting how the nonprofit
corporation laws of California and New York created different categories of nonprofit
corporations and assigned them varying degrees of fiduciary obligation).
81. See Oberly, 592 A.2d 461-62 (Del. 1991).
82. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS. § 305(a) (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007).
83. Id. at § 305(b).
84. Id. at § 305(c).
85. See REV. MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.30(a) (1987).
86. MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.30(c) (2008).
87. Id.
88. While the duty of good faith has been treated as an independent duty by some scholars,
this article adopts the convincing view of the Delaware Supreme Court that the duty is
essentially an integrated component of duties of care and loyalty:
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B. THE THREE PILLARS
Daniel L. Kurtz has excellently summarized the three
overarching duties of nonprofit directors:
The duty of care concerns the director's competence in
performing directorial functions and typically requires him to
use the care that an ordinarily prudent person would exercise
in a like position and under similar circumstances. The duty
of loyalty requires the director's faithful pursuit of the
interests of the organization he serves rather than the
financial or other interests of the director or of another
person or organization. And the duty of obedience requires
that a director act with fidelity, within the bounds of the law
generally, to the or anization's "mission," as expressed in its
charter and by-laws.*
This section analyzes each of these duties in detail.
1. Duty of Care
The duty of care obligations of nonprofit directors are similar to
those imposed on their for-profit corporate counterparts. 90 The duty
mandates that directors must exercise their responsibilities in good
faith and with diligence.91  They cannot fail to supervise the
corporation, and, even if acting in good faith, cannot neglect to make
informed decisions. 92 The duty is both about procedure (did the
directors act with care during the decision-makinj process?) as well as
substance (was the decision rash or reasonable?).
[AIlthough good faith may be described colloquially as part of a "triad" of fiduciary
duties that includes the duties of care and loyalty, the obligation to act in good faith
does not establish an independent fiduciary duty that stands on the same footing as
the duties of care and loyalty. Only the latter two duties, where violated, may directly
result in liability, whereas a failure to act in good faith may do so, but indirectly. The
second doctrinal consequence is that the fiduciary duty of loyalty is not limited to
cases involving a financial or other cognizable fiduciary conflict of interest. It also
encompasses cases where the fiduciary fails to act in good faith.
Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) (footnote omitted). See also Linda Sugin,
Resisting the Corporatization of Nonprofit Governance: Transforming Obedience into Fidelity,
76 FORDHAM L. REV. 893, 897 (2007) (providing an overview of the directorial duties of
nonprofit corporations).
89. DANIEL L. KURTZ, BOARD LIABILITY: GUIDE FOR NONPROFIT DIREcTORS 21 (1988)
(emphasis added).
90. See Bishop, supra note 41, at 703-04 (highlighting that the 2008 Model Nonprofit
Corporation Act and the 2007 draft of the ALI Principles of the Law of Nonprofit
Organizations create fiduciary duties of care comparable to those imposed on for-profit
corporate directors).
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One version of the duty of care standard, as articulated by the
Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act, states: A director shall
discharge his or her duties as a director, including his or her duties as
a member of a committee:
(1) in good faith;
(2) with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position
would exercise under similar circumstances; and
(3) in a manner the director reasonably believes to be in the best
interests of the corporation.14
Another articulation of the duty of care requires a director to act
"in good faith . . . in a manner the director reasonably believes to be
in the best interests of the corporation . . [and] discharge [his or her]
duties with the care that a person in a like position would reasonably
believe" to be in the corporation's best interest.95 An additional
source requires directors to act "with the care that an ordinarily
prudent person would reasonably be expected to exercise in a like
position and under similar circumstances."9 6
The duty of care obligation essentially adheres to the ordinary
negligence standard, 7 but it is also subject to the business judgment
rule, which stipulates that directors must not be held liable to the
corporation if they exercise their judgment with care.98 Accordingly,
directorial liability for an alleged breach of duty of care cannot be
imposed absent gross negligence.99
2. Duty of Loyalty
The duty of loyalty requires that each board member "act in a
manner that he or she reasonably believes to be in the best interests
of the charity, in light of its stated purposes."1a The duty entails both
prohibitions-to refrain from harmful conduct against the
corporation-as well as the affirmative obligation to protect the
corporation."" As the Delaware Supreme Court notes:
[Corporate officers and directors] stand in a fiduciary relation
94. REV. MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.30 cmt. 3 (1987).
95. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.30(a), (b) (2005).
96. PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE § 4.01(a) (1992).
97. Bishop, supra note 41, at 730.
98. See id.; Evelyn Brody, The Limits of Charity Fiduciary Law, 57 MD. L. REV. 1400,
1424-25 (1998) [hereinafter Brody, Limits of Charity Lawl (because duty of care is subject to
the business judgment rule, a director "breaches the duty of care only by committing 'gross
negligence' rather than ordinary neglig ence."). See also inlra Part III.C (discussing the
business judgment rule in the nonprofit sector).
99. Brody, supra note 98, at 1425.
100. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS. § 310(a) (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007).
101. See Bishop, supra note 41, at 739.
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to the corporation .... A public policy, existing through the
years, and derived from a profound knowledge of human
characteristics and motives, has established a rule that
demands of rthem], peremptorily and inexorably, the most
scrupulous observance of his duty, not only affirmatively to
protect the interests of the corporation committed to his
charge, but also to refrain from doing anything that would
work injury to the corporation, or to deprive it of profit or
advantage which his skill and ability might properly bring to
it, or to enable it to make in the reasonable and lawful
exercise of its powers.
The director's loyalties may not be divided,103 and the director
must place the interests of the corporation above his or her own.10
He or she must act in good faith and "maintain . . . unequivocal
allegiance to the corporate mission.""os Even when the director is
financially disinterested, he or she may still violate the duty of loyalty
if the director knowingly "fails to warn other directors of material
facts relevant to a transaction.")"' As such, duty of loyalty is largely
about addressing direct or indirect conflicts of interest between the
director and the corporation.107 Unlike the duty of care, which may
be breached by negligent conduct, disloyal acts are generally
intentional,'" although indifference to protect the organization or
abdication and dereliction of duties'" are sufficient to establish
breach of duty of loyalty.1 o
3. Duty of Obedience
The duty of obedience has been defined as an obligation "to
carry out the purposes of the organization as expressed in the [the
organization's founding documents]."" The duty is largely based on
the doctrine of ultra vires,1 12 the notion that corporations are
102. Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939) (emphasis added).
103. Scc I. MAURICE WORMSER, FRANKENSTEIN INCORPORATED 125-30 (1931).
104. Scc 3 FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 837.50 (rev.
2002).
105. Michael W. Peregrine, Legal Concerns in Specific Health Care Delivery Settings:
Nonprofit Corporate Governance, in 3 HEALTH L. PRAC. GUIDE 43, § 22 (2010).
106. Hazen & Hazen Punctilios, supra note 76, at 381.
107. Sce id. at 356, 380-85.
108. Bishop, supra note 41, at 740.
109. Id. at 702-03 ("Unfortunately, abdication and dereliction are far more common on
volunteer nonprofit charitable boards [than in for-profit corporations]. . . . [Nonprofit] directors
often view their role as advisory rather than supervisory.").
110. Id. at 740.
111. JAMES I. FISHMAN & STEPHEN SCHWARZ, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND
MATERIALS 219 (3d ed. 2006).
112. Scc Gearhart Indus., Inc. v. Smith Int'l, Inc., 741 F.2d 707, 719-20 (5th Cir. 1984) ("The
duty of obedience requires a director to avoid committing ultra vires acts, i.e., acts beyond the
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creatures of enumerated powers, as defined in their corporate charter
or the powers granted to them by the state.113
While ultra vires is now largely thought of as obsolete in for-
profit corporate governance,1 1 4 it appears to be relevant in nonprofit
corporation law as a component of the duty of obedience,'" which
itself is in danger of vanishing. Despite the duty's long history,"' the
mention of the obligation has been avoided, or its importance
outright rejected, by modern statutory, advisory, and scholarly
authorities. 1 This attitude has become so pervasive that one scholar
considers the future of the duty to be "very much at risk."" 8
Nonetheless, the duty still appears in case law, although seldomly.119
As an example, a 2007 New Jersey Supreme Court case that involved
Princeton University as defendant observed that:
[F]iduciaries of a charitable corporation have a "special duty"
to advance the charitable purposes of the charitable
corporation and protect its assets by doing so. Essentially,
this "special duty" is akin to the duty of obedience, a duty
finding its origination in trust law, which commands "that
directors of a charitable corporation have a unique fiduciary
duty to be faithful to their organization's mission."1 20
scope of the [authority] of the corporation as defined by its (chartcrj or the laws of the state of
incorporation.").
113. See Beaty v. Lessee of Knowler, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 152, 167 (1830) ("The exercise of the
corporate franchise, being restrictive of individual rights, cannot be extended beyond the letter
and spirit of the act of incorporation."). See also Robert S. Stevens, A Proposal as to the
Codification and Restatement of the Ultra Vires Doctrine, 36 YALE L.J. 297, 309 (1927)
(defining the ultra vires doctrine as an act that goes beyond what is granted by either the charter
or the state).
114. See Kent Greenfield, Ultra Vires Lives: A Stakeholder Analysis of Corporate Illegality
(With Notes on How Corporate Law Could Reinforce International Law Norms), 87 VA L.
REV. 1279, 1302-13 (2002) (providing a thorough historical overview of the rise and fall of ultra
vires); Alan R. Palmiter, Duty of Obedience: The Forgotten Duty, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 457,
460 (2010/2011) (noting that "as corporate law (and judicial review of corporate actions) moved
from questions of corporate power to those of fiduciary duty, the ultra vires doctrine became
largely vestigial-and its appendage, the duty of obedience, quietly wilted away").
115. See Sugin, supra note 88, at 900.
116. See HENRY W. BALLANTINE, BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS § 62 (rev. ed. 1946).
117. See, e.g., FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 72, at 226 (arguing that "Itlo the extent the duty
of obedience does not carry with it a duty to assure that the trust is meeting contemporaneous
needs, it does not set forth an appropriate standard"); MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT (2008)
(lacking any mention of the duty of obedience); PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS.
§ 300 cmt. g(3) (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007) (rejecting the duty of obedience because it may
conflict with "the obligation to keep the purpose of the charity current and useful"); Sugin,
supra note 88, at 897 (noting that no state statutes include the duty of obedience as a
governance requirement).
118. Sugin, supra note 88, at 897.
119. See Hazen & Hazen, Punctilios, supra note 76, at nn. 205, 206 (providing lists of cases in
the for-profit and nonprofit sectors where courts have addressed the duty of obedience).
120. Robertson v. Princeton University, No. C-99-02, 2007 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 3016,
at 129 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. Oct. 25, 2007) (quoting Robert A. Katz, Symposium: Who
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C. THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE
The business judgment rule protects directors from liability if a
mistake harming the corporation is made with due care and in good
faith.121 The doctrine serves as a significant hurdle to plaintiffs
claiming directorial breach of duty of carel22 and in effect only
permits adverse action against directors in cases of gross
negligence.123 Under the rule, the burden is on the plaintiff to show
the breach of the duty.124 In its articulation of the rule, the Delaware
Supreme Court noted:
It is a presumption that in making a business decision the
directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good
faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the
best interests of the company. Absent an abuse of discretion,
that judgment will be respected by the courts. The burden is
on the party challenging the decision to establish facts
rebutting the presumption. . . .
[The business judgment doctrine] has no role where directors
have either abdicated their functions, or absent a conscious
decision, failed to act. But it also follows that under
applicable principles, a conscious decision to refrain from
acting may nonetheless be a valid exercise of business
judgment and enjoy the protections of the rule.12 5
Essentially, the rule prevents courts from reviewing the merits of
the directors' decision unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the
directors were prejudiced or failed to exercise due care.126
Guards the Guardians?: Monitoring and Enforcement of Charity Governance: Let Charitablc
Directors Direct: Why Trust Law Should Not Curb Board Discretion Over a Charitable
Corporation's Mission and Unrestricted Assets. 80 CM.-KENT L. REV. 689, 699 (2005)).
121. Sec Park McGinty, The Twihght ofFiduciary Duties: On the Nccd for Sharcholder Self-
Help in an Age of Formalistic Proccduralism, 46 EMORY L.J. 163, 194 (1997) (providing a
background on the business judgment rule); PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE § 4.01(c)
(1992) ("[a] director or officer who makes a business judgment in good faith fulfills the duty" if
the person (i) "is not interested . . . in the subject of the business judgment"; (ii) is informed
properly; and (iii) "rationally believes that the business judgment is in the best interests of the
corporation"); Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?, 7 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 55, 56 (1991) (the business judgment rule "presumes reasonable diligence and
good faith.").
122. See ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 123 (1986) (noting that the doctrine dictates
"that the business judgment of the directors will not be challenged or overturned by courts ...
and the directors will not be held liable for the consequences of their exercise of business
judgment-even for judgments that appear to have been clear mistakes-unless certain
exceptions apply").
123. See Brody, supra note 98, at 1425.
124. See Clark W. Furlow, Reflections on the Revlon Doctrine, 11 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 519, 522
(2009).
125. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812-13 (Dcl. 1984) (citations omitted) (footnote
omitted).
126. Sec Furlow, supra note 124, at 520.
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Accordingly, the business judgment rule "is a standard of j udicial
review for director conduct, not a standard of conduct."' The
justifications for the rule include encouraging corporate innovation
and rational risk-taking and limiting litigation and judicial
intrusiveness.
While primarily a rule for for-profit enterprises, the doctrine's
application to nonprofit corporate governance has been confirmed in
a number of jurisdictions, 29 a development supported by some
commentators 1 but opposed by others.
IV. ENFORCEMENT OF NONPROFIT FIDUCIARY
OBLIGATIONS
While there are differences between charitable trusts and
nonprofit corporations,132 with the former imposing a stricter duty of
care on fiduciaries,'33 the fiduciaries' obligations in both forms are
127. 1 DENNIS J. BLOCK ET AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF
CORPORATE DIRECTORS 4 (5th ed. 1998).
128. See Harvey J. Goldschmid, The Fiduciary Duties of Nonprofit Directors and Officers:
Paradoxes, Problems, and Proposed Reforms, 23 J. CORP. L. 631, 644 (1998).
129. See S.C. Code Ann. § 33-31-830, cmt. 3 (2013)("Although it may seem anomalous to
apply the business judgment rule to nonprofit corporations, a few courts have so applied it ....
While the application of the business judgment rule to directors of nonprofit corporations is not
firmly established by the case law, its use is consistent with section 8.30."). Sec also John v.
John, 450 N.W.2d 795 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that the nonprofit directors' fraudulent
conduct was not protected by the business judgment rule); Yarnall Warehouse & Transfer, Inc.
v. Three Ivory Bros. Moving Co., 226 So. 2d 887, 890 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969) (applying the
business judgment rule to analyze the actions of a nonprofit director).
130. See, e.g., Bishop, supra note 41, at 702 (arguing that a "few would seriously suggest that
a nonprofit corporate director's fiduciary duty of care to oversee management should exceed
that of a for-profit corporate director counterpart"); Goldschmid, supra note 128, at 644
(asserting that there is "wisdom in protecting nonprofit directors from hindsight reviews of their
unsuccessful decisions and encouraging them to change the configuration of their nonprofit
enterprises.... It is sound public policy to accept the risk that informed decisions by nonprofit
directors, undertaken honestly, without conflict of interest, and rationally believed to be in the
best interests of the nonprofit, may not be vindicated by subsequent success").
131. See Lee, supra note 16, at 927 (contending that the business judgment rule should not
protect nonprofit directors because "ilt is highly questionable whether nonprofit directors
warrant the extraordinary latitude bestowed upon for-profit directors when, in theory at least,
the mission statements of their respective organizations lie at opposite ends of the spectrum").
132. Sec Brody, Charity Governance, supra note 76, at 643-44 ("JAI trust is not an entity-
rather, a trust is viewed as a relationship between the settlor and the trustee to use specific
property for a designated purpose. By contrast, the fiduciaries of a corporate charity are
separate from the legal personality of the charity. Accordingly . . . a corporate charity could be
liable for a breach of contract or a tort even if the corporate directors have not breached their
fiduciary duties to the charity.").
133. See id. at 648 (highlighting the differences between charitable trusts and charitable
corporations and discussing how trust law imposes stricter fiduciary duty standards on charitable
trusts than does corporate law on nonprofit corporations); Sara R. Kusiak, The Case for A. U
(Accountable Universities): Enforcing University Administrator Fiduciary Dutics Through
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largely enforced through similar mechanisms: public enforcement by
the state attorneys general, 3 4 or private enforcement through the
special interest doctrine."' A third subcategory of enforcement
mechanism is the nontrust based derivative suit rooted in for-profit
corporate law, which in charity law is only available to membership-
based nonprofit corporations. 13 6  Other potential enforcement
mechanisms are either theoretical or limited in practice and thus
beyond the span of this article. 13 7
Student Dcrivative Suits, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 129, 135 (2006) (stating that trust law "imposes the
strictest duties of loyalty, care, fair dealing, and obedience on Ithe charitable trust] trustees").
Sec also James J. Fishman, The Development of Nonprofit Corporation Law and an Agenda for
Reform, 34 EMORY L.J. 617, 651-52 (1985) (highlighting the historical roots of the distinction
between the charitable corporation and the charitable trust and tracing the supervisional
evolution of the entities to the jurisdictional divide between the chancery and equity courts). In
the United States, courts concluded early on that corporate trustees should fall under the
jurisdiction of equity courts, which meant that "corporate directors and officers had greater
managerial control over the corporation's property" than the fiduciaries of charitable trusts. Id.
134. Sce gencrally FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 72, at 336-38 (providing an overview of the
oversight authority given to the attorney general's office). The state attorney general's power in
this regard are quite extensive:
The range of court actions that an attorney general may request a court to take to
enforce fiduciary duties is as broad as the powers of the court to devise remedies for
breach of fiduciary duties. He may request accountings, removal of trustees,
dissolution of corporations, forced transfer of corporate property, or a combination of
these. He may ask the court to force charitable fiduciaries to restore losses caused by
breach of duty and to return profits made in the course of administering the trust. He
may seek to enjoin trustees from further wrongdoing or from continuing certain
specific actions. Furthermore, transactions involving a breach of the duty of loyalty
may be voided at the option of the attorney general unless he decides it is in the public
interest to affirm them. The attorney general . . . may bring actions requesting
modification or deviation from the terms of a trust or cy pres application of the funds.
Id. at 309.
135. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 391 (1959) ( "A suit can be maintained for
the enforcement of a charitable trust by . . . a person who has a special interest in the
enforcement of the charitable trust."). See also Mary Grace Blasko, et al., Standing to Sue in
the Charitable Sector, 28 U.S.F. L. REV. 37, 52 (1993) (noting the expansion of the special
interest doctrine to charitable corporations).
136. See Hazen & Hazen, Punctilios supra note 76, at 405 (providing a general overview of
remedies for nonprofit director abuse); MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT, ch. 13 (2008)
(providing the framework for derivative suits in nonprofit corporations); REV. MODEL
NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 6.01(a) (1987) ("[A nonprofit corporation] may establish criteria ...
for the admission of members."). The members are similar to shareholders as they have voting
rights and may pay membership fees. They also have the right to bring derivative lawsuits on
behalf of the corporation. Id. at §§ 1.40(21), 6.30.
137. See, e.g., Rob Atkinson, Unsettled Standing: Who (Else) Should Enforce the Duties of
Charitable Fiduciaries?, 23 J. CORP. L. 655 (discussing numerous theories supporting the
expansion of standing in order to more widely enforce charitable fiduciary obligations); Terri
Lynn Helge, Policing the Good Guys: Regulation of The Charitablk Sector Through a Federal
Charity Oversight Board, 19 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 47-53 (2009) (highlighting the
seldom-used relator actions (attorneys general granting proxy standing to individuals to bring
suit), visitorial powers (enabling the founder of a charitable organization to inquire into how the
entity is being managed), and voluntary contractual relationships between private for-profit
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A. ATTORNEY GENERAL ENFORCEMENT
In every state, statute or common law permits the state attorneys
general, as parens patrie,13 8 to supervise nonprofits and enforce the
fiduciary duties of charitable corporations in order to protect the
public interest."' It is broadly understood, however, that due to the
lack of funds and resources, the state attorneys general "have neither
the person-power, nor sometimes the will, to monitor nonprofits
effectively." 0 Accordingly, although the attorney general's power is
substantial, the actual extent of charitable supervision is limited. 141
B. THE SPECIAL INTEREST DOCTRINE
Courts may permit a private person to sue a charitable
corporation by finding that the person has a "special interest" in the
organization.' 2  The doctrine finds its roots in trust law, yet some
courts have liberally applied the principle to grant standing in a
number of cases involving charitable corporations. 143 However, while
the usage of the doctrine by a beneficiary of a private trust could
bring monetary damages to the plaintiff, the remedy the special
interest plaintiff suing a charitable corporation seeks must be for a
monitoring companics and the charitable organization).
138. Parcns patriac literally means "parent of the country." State of W. Va. v. Chas. Pfizer
& Co., 440 F.2d 1079,1089 (2d Cir. 1971). Parens patriac powers are derived from the "ancient
powers of guardianship over persons under disability and of protectorship of the public interest
which were originally held by the Crown of England . . . and which as part of the common law
devolved upon the states and federal government." In re Pruner's Estate, 136 A.2d 107, 109
(1957) (citations omitted). In its early form, the authority enabled the King to act as the
"general guardian of all infants, idiots, and lunatics" with "the general superintendence of all
charitable uses in the kingdom." 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *47. In practice,
some scholars have argued that the authority was used when the king stood to benefit
financially by assuming guardianship and that "the profit motive was clearly at the forefront of
the king's decision to offer his protection." George B. Curtis, The Checkered Career of Parens
Patriac: The State as Parent or Tyrant?, 25 DEPAUL L. REv. 895, 898 (1976).
139. Gary, supra note 70, at 622.
140. Fishman, supra note 91, at 268. See also Blasko et al., supra note 135, at 48 (noting the
understaffing problems faced by the attorney general charitable enforcement divisions); David
Villar Patton, The Qucen, the Attorney General. and the Modern Charitable Fiduciary: A
Historical Perspective on Charitable Enforcement Reform, 11 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 131,
164-65 (2000) (highlighting the budgetary challenges of the state attorneys general in their
charitable enforcement efforts).
141. See Gary, supra note 70, at 622-23 (highlighting the scarce resources in attorney general
offices' charitable divisions).
142. Id. at 627.
143. See, c.g., Lopez v. Medford Cmty. Ctr., Inc., 424 N.E.2d 229, 233 (Mass. 1981)
(recognizing special interest standing against a charitable corporation). See also Blasko et al.,
supra note 135 and accompanying text.
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"benefit to the charity itself and not money damages for the
plaintiffs."144
According to a 1993 study, special interest status is generally
granted by courts considering five factors:
"(a) the extraordinary nature of the acts complained of and
the remedy sought by the plaintiff; (b) the presence of fraud
or misconduct on the part of the charity or its directors; (c)
the state attorney general's availability or effectiveness; and
(d) the nature of the benefitted class and its relationship to
the charityl 45 . .. and (e) "subjective and case-specific factual
circumstances"146 and "social desirability." 147
C. DERIVATIVE ACTIONS
In most states, members of nonprofit corporations have a
statutory right, similar to for-profit shareholders, to bring a derivative
suit on behalf of the corporation in order to enforce directorial
duties.148  Any damages plaintiffs recovered through derivative
actions symbolize the vindication of the corporation's rights and not
those of the individual plaintiffs.149  As such, the damages thus
secured must be returned to the corporation.5 0
The next section examines the above-noted enforcement
mechanisms in the context of university director accountability.
V. ACTIONS AGAINST UNIVERSITY TRUSTEES
The state attorney general is the only party that has automatic
standing to bring suit against the trustees of an incorporated
nonprofit university.15 1 But, as noted above, attorneys general seldom
have the resources to enforce the fiduciary obligations of charitable
trustees. As a result, public directorial enforcement of duties is not
common.
144. Gary, supra note 70, at 627.
145. Blasko ct al., supra note 135, at 61.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 74.
148. Kusiak, supra note 133, at 148. See also Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. 331, 335 (1855)
(granting derivative rights to shareholders for the first time in American law).
149. Dodge, 59 U.S. at 335.
150. See Susanna M. Kim, Conflicting Idcologies of Group Litigation: Who May Challcnge
Settlements in Class Actions and Denvative Suits, 66 TENN. L. REV. 81, 99 (1998) (discussing
that because the derivative suit is an equitable remedy where a shareholder asserts a claim that
belongs to the corporation and not to the shareholder, the shareholder's right is derivative and
secondary, and thus "any judgment ultimately recovered by the shareholder belongs to the
corporation").
151. See supra text accompanying note 134.
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Under the special interest doctrine, others may also bring suit,
but their standing is not guaranteed. 5 2 One would think that students
might be able to invoke the doctrine with relative ease, but they
seldom gain standing against their university for breaches of fiduciar
duty claims or challenges regarding how the institution is managed.1
In cases where students have claimed a special interest, courts have
often used Justice Marshall's dictum in the Dartmouth College case,
noting that "the students are fluctuating, and no individual among our
youth has a vested interest in the institution, which can be asserted in
a court of justice," 154 to deny standing.'5 5
As for derivative action, because such suits are only available to
corporations with members' 6 and nonprofit universities are not
membership-based, the action cannot be used as a method of bringing
trustee accountability. Although one scholar has argued that
university students do have a "strong case" for derivative standing,'
that argument, so far, has not been merited by any court.
In short, there are serious limitations to both public and private
enforcement of directorial obligations at universities. The limitations
arise from both resource-based concerns as well as standing-related
challenges. Nonetheless, there have been some exceptions. The
remainder of this section is devoted to examining two rare cases
152. Sce supra Part IV.B.
153. Blasko et al., supra note 135, at 64 ("In most cases courts deny standing to university
students primarily because of the amorphous and fluctuating nature of the class of students.").
154. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 641 (1819).
155. See, e.g., Miller v. Alderhold, 184 S.E.2d 172, 175 (Ga. 1971) (holding that the students
lacked standing to challenge the acts of the trustees and administrators in the college's
operations because it was a private corporation and the students did not have a vested financial
interest in the institution). Sec also Russell v. Yale Univ., 737 A.2d 941, 946 (Conn. App. Ct.
1999) (affirming lower court's denial of standing to students who invoked the special interest
doctrine in challenging Yale's reorganization of the divinity school); Steeneck v. Univ. of
Bridgeport, No. CV 93 0133773, 1994 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2112, at 14-19 (Conn. Super. Ct.
Aug. 18, 1994) (denying standing to a student who challenged the actions of the trustees in
securing a loan from a religiously affiliated organization which, as a condition of the loan, could
nominate sixty percent of the trustees, a level of control that the student believed could violate
the school's nonsectarian charter). But cf Jones v. Grant, 344 So. 2d 1210, 1212 (Ala. 1977)
("The students of a charitable institution are beneficiaries of a charitable trust .... Where the
grants and loans were for the purpose of upgrading the staff and faculty, as well as the student
body, members of the staff and faculty also are beneficiaries .... We find that the interest of
the students, staff and faculty as beneficiaries in the financing of the educational institution with
which they are associated is a sufficient special interest to entitle them to bring suit."). But see
Cook v. Lloyd Noland Foundation, 825 So. 2d 83, 84 (Ala. 2001) (noting that "for trusts
incorporated as nonprofit corporations, the enactment of the Alabama Nonprofit Corporation
Act . . . superseded [the] right as recognized by Jones" which only allows the state attorney
general to bring action and not the beneficiaries of charitable trusts). Id. at 87.
156. See supra Part IV.C.
157. See Kusiak, supra note 133, at 164 (asserting that Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat'l
Training Sch. for Deaconesses & Missionaries, 381 F. Supp. 1003 (D.D.C. 1974), would allow
nonmembers to bring a derivative suit against a nonprofit corporation).
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where higher education trustee accountability was maintained
successfully through judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings.
A. THE WILSON COLLEGE CASE
In February of 1979, the Board of Trustees of Wilson College, an
incorporated private women's college chartered by the Pennsylvania
legislature,' voted to close the institution by June 30th because of
financial constraints.15 9  The trustees also decided to change the
college's corporate name to Wilson College Foundation, an entity
that would receive the college's corporate assets and would invest
them in order to "continue to work toward the aims of Wilson
College . . . [the purpose for which], as stated by its founders . . .
[was] to provide for women the opportunity for a broad and thorough
education of the highest quality."' In their declaration, the trustees
noted that the Foundation would pursue its objectives by providing
"educational research and development and scholarships for the
undergraduate education of women."161
The board's resolution was largely based on dwindling
admissions numbers, with the reduction of the college's entering class
from the peak of 252 in 1965 to 55 in 1978.162 While the college could
handle a student body of 650, its overall enrollment in February of
1979 was only 214 students.163
Shortly after the trustees' vote, a dissenting trustee, 164 together
with a group of alumnae, faculty, and enrolled as well as accepted but
not yet matriculated students, petitioned the court seeking injunctive
relief.'65 They also later asked that Wilson Colle e also be made a co-
petitioner, a motion that the judge granted.'6  The court found,
without providing any analysis, that the dissenting trustee, faculty,
alumnae, and Wilson College had standing to maintain the
proceeding but that the enrolled and prospective student petitioners
did not.167
158. See Zehner v. Alexander, 3 FRANKLIN COUNTY LEGAL J. 27, 29 (Pa. Orphans' Ct.
1979).
159. Id. at 35.
160. Id. at 70-71.
161. Id. at 71.
162. Fred M. Hechinger, Wilson College, A 'Lost Cause,' Looks Lively, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
11, 1980, at C1.
163. Zehner v. Alexander, supra note 158, at 37.
164. The dissenting trustee, Jean Colgan Zehner, disagreed with the board's decision to close
the college but did not cast a vote against the resolution as she was abroad at the time the
special meeting was held. Id. at 30.
165. Id. at 28, 30-34.
166. Id. at 28.
167. Id. at 84.
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The petitioners sought that the trustees "show cause why they
should not be removed immediately as trustees"168 and also be
'permanently enjoined from implementing the closing of the
college."' 6 ' The petitioners contended that "the very act of voting to
close the College and then without Court approval proceeding to
implement that decision . . . was totally detrimental to the charter
purpose of Wilson College and grounds for judicial removal" 70 and
that the evidence presented "established a history of
mismanagement" that justified the board's dismissal.171
The court agreed with the petitioners that the cy pres doctrine,'72
as codified by the legislature,' required court approval for any
fundamental change to a nature of a nonprofit corporation, which the
respondents had not sought.174 The court noted:
By implementing the decision to close Wilson College the
Trustees attempted to essentially deprive the Court of its
power to review the recommendation of the Board and to
approve or disapprove the proposed diversion of college
assets from a teaching institution to some other charitable
use. In addition, the implementation of the decision to close
Wilson College without prior approval of the Court
attempted to deprive the public, represented by the Attorney
General as parens patriae, of an opportunity to comment
upon or protest the decision.
Nonetheless, the court refused to dismiss the entire board, finding
"no evidence of fraudulent conduct or dishonest acts with reference
to the corporation by any trustee." 7 6
168. Zehncr v. Alexander, supra 158 note at 28.Id. at 28.
169. Id. at 28.
170. Id at 83
171. Id.
172. Cypres literally means "as near as" and comes from the French Norman expression "cy
pres comme possible," which means "as near as possible." See Kolb v. City of Storm Lake, 736
N.W.2d 546, 553 (Iowa 2007). It is a common law doctrine that "permits a court to change the
purpose or recipients of a charitable trust under certain circumstances." Id. (citations omitted).
As defined in RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TRUSTS § 399 (1935), the doctrine of cypres reads as
follows:
If property is given in trust to be applied to a particular charitable purpose, and it is or
becomes impossible or impracticable or illegal to carry out the particular purpose, and
if the settlor manifested a more general intention to devote the property to charitable
purposes, the trust will not fail but the Court will direct the application of the property
to some charitable purpose which falls within the general charitable intention of the
settlor.
173. See 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5547 (2012) ("Property committed to charitable purposes
shall not, by any proceeding ... be diverted from the objects to which it was donated, granted or
devised, unless and until the board of directors or other body obtains from the court an order
... specifying the disposition of the property.").
174. Zehner v. Alexander, supra note 158, at 81.
175. Id. at 82.
176. Id. at 83.
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The court did find, however, that the college president, who was
also a board member, acted with "gross abuse of authority and
discretion," and thus removed her permanently from the board. 7 7
The court also removed another board member for conflict of
interest, noting that the member's presidency of the all-women Bryn
Mawr College, which competed with Wilson "for women students out
of the national pool of students," 7  presented "proper cause" for
removal. 179
The court declined to remove any of the remaining trustees,
noting that the petitioners had failed to prove that the trustees'
conduct "constituted 'gross abuse of authority or discretion with
reference to the corporation' or 'any other proper cause.'
180
However, in its decree, the court forbade Wilson College from paying
the respondents' court costs, finding their vote to dismantle the
college "indefensible procedurally and substantively."' '
The court concluded by enjoining the closing of the college on
June 30 "or on any other date . . . without prior Court approval."18 2
Without appealing the case, the entire board resigned shortly after
the ruling. 8 The college remains open as of this article's writing.184
B. ADELPHI UNIVERSITY
In a 1995 survey of 477 private colleges, the president of Adelphi
University in Long Island, Peter Diamandopoulos, was ranked as the
second highest paid universit president in the country, earning
$523,636 in 1993 to 1994. The report fueled the anti-
Diamandopoulos' voices on campus, led by faculty who had
complained of the president's and the board of trustees' lavish
spending of the university's resources, despite grim admissions
177. Zehner v. Alexander, supra note 158, at 83. The court also found that the president
"misled the Board, student body, alumnae and the public as to the state of the College ... either
by design or by a total failure ... to maintain any supervision of the Director of Admissions."
Id. at 78.
178. Id. at 79
179. Id. at 83.
180. Id. at 83-84.
181. Id. at 86.
182. Id.
183. Hechinger, supra note 162.
184. See Lawrence Biemiller, Seeking Enrollment Boost, Wilson College Will Admit Men,
CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 13, 2013, http://chronicle.com/article/Seeking-Enrollment-
Boost/136657/ (announcing the board of trustees' decision to enroll men to the college's
traditional undergraduate program).
185. Douglas Lederman, Private Colleges' Pay: A 'Chronicle' Survey, CHRON. OF HIGHER
EDUC., Sept. 29, 1995, at A23. The highest paid president during the same period was Boston
University's. Id.
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numbers and the cost-cutting efforts that had included staff layoffs.' 86
In addition to generous compensation, the board had provided Mr.
Diamandopoulos with a $1.2 million Manhattan apartment,
purchased with university funds, as well as another official residence,
a Tudor-style house close to the campus.187 The board had also
approved reimbursement from the university of any income taxes
paid on fringe benefits and compensation for sabbaticals that Mr.
Diamandopoulos did not take. 8 The board's spending on itself
included a trip to Greece for one of its meetings.'8 9
To hold the board accountable, several faculty memebers,
students, and former university officials formed a group called the
Committee to Save Adelphi ("CSA"). 90 Within months after its
formation, the CSA asked the New York State Board of Regents,
which under New York law 9' "is the only state board of education
having authority over all educational activity at all levels, including
private and public, nonprofit, and for profit institutions,"' 9 2 to remove
the board, contending that the board had failed to oversee the
president's expenditures and that its members had engaged in self-
dealing by selling products and services such as insurance and
advertisements to the university.193
The Regents agreed. With respect to the president's
compensation, the Regents found that "the trustees failed to exercise
the degree of care and skill that ordinarily prudent persons would
have exercised in like circumstances,"1 94 and that they "failed to
186. Doreen Carvajal, Presidents vPay Rank/cs Some at Adelphi N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1995,
http://www.nytimes.com/1995/09/30/nyregion/prcsident-s-pay-rankles-some-at-adelphi.html.
187. Carvajal, supra note 186.
188. Karen W. Arenson, Letters Ilumine Add/phi Head's Rich Deal, N.Y. TIMES, July 27,
1996, http://www.nytimes.com/1996/07/27/nyregion/letters-ilumine-adelphi-head-s-rich-deal.html.
189. See Carvajal, supra note 186.
190. Id.
191. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 216 (2013) (giving the Regents broad authority to "incorporate any
university, college, academy, library, museum, or other institution or association for the
promotion of science, literature, art, history or other department of knowledge, or of education
in any way, associations of teachers, students, graduates of educational institutions, and other
associations whose approved purposes are, in whole or in part, of educational or cultural value
deemed worthy of recognition and encouragement by the university"); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 216-a
(2013) (subjecting the institutions chartered or incorporated by Regents to the state's not-for-
profit corporation laws).
192. History of the Board & University of the State of New York, NY ST. EDUC. DEP'T.,
http://www.regents.nysed.gov/about/history-usny.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2013).
193. See Petition, COMM. TO SAVE ADELPHI, https://folio.iupui.edulbitstream/handle/
10244/502/THE%20COMMITTEE%20TO%20SAVE%20ADELPHI.pdf'?sequence=1. See also
Courtney Leatherman, Hearings on Adephi U Trgger a Debate About New Yorks Authority
Over Private Colleges, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Sept. 13, 1996, at A42 (providing a
background on the CSA hearings).
194. See Vacco v. Diamandopoulos, 715 N.Y.S.2d 269, 272 (1998) (quoting the findings of
the NY State Bd. of Regents).
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exercise due care to ensure that Diamandopoulos' compensation
package as a whole was 'reasonable' and 'commensurate with the
services performed,' as required by [New York Not-for-Profit
Corporation Law]."195
As for the trustees' use of a fellow trustee's insurance brokerage
firm for Adelphi, the Regents concluded that "[the trustee] and
Diamandopoulos neglected their fiduciary duties to Adelphi," and
that "Diamandopoulos' actions were not consistent with his duties of
undivided loyalty and care to Adelphi."196 The Regents also found
that Diamandopoulos and the former trustee must be removed "for
neglect of their duties of due care and loyalty." 197
With respect to the trustees' utilization of a fellow trustee's
advertising firm for the university, the Regents found that the trustee
"neglected both his duties of due care and undivided loyalty to
Adelphi," 98 and also "violated his fiduciary duty by failing to disclose
to the board that [the firm] was, indeed, being paid for services
rendered to Adelphi." 199 The Regents concluded that the president
and the trustee should be removed "for neglect of their fiduciary
duties of due care and loyalty."20 They also found that "the full
board of trustees neglected its duty of due care to Adelphi by failing
to take a ropriate action once it learned of the trustees' potential
conflicts" and ordered the removal of eighteen of the nineteen
trustees, replacing them with new trustees that the Regents
selected.20 The dismissed trustees included Mr. Diamandopoulos,
although the Regents took no action against him as president, as
doing so would not have been permitted under New York law.203
Within two weeks, however, the new trustees fired Mr.
Diamandopoulos.20
Separately, the New York Attorney General's office began an
investigation into the university's finances, 205 and in March of 1997,
the state sued the former president and trustees for misspent money,
attempting to hold the members personally liable.2 06 The suit also





200. Id. at 273 (quoting the findings of the NY State Bd. of Regents).
201. Id.
202. Id at 271.
203. Scc Bruce Lambert, New York Regents Oust 18 Trustees from Adephi U, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 11, 1997, at Al.
204. Courtney Leatherman, New Adelphi Board Fires the University's Controversial
President, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Feb. 28,1997, at A35.
205. Se Carvajal, supra note 186, at 26.
206. Se Diamandopoulos, 715 N.Y.S.2d at 273 (denying the defendants' motion to dismiss
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sought restitution of legal fees spent to defend the former officials
and accused the trustees of breaching their responsibilities by
permitting two of the members to do business with the university,
including the payment of $1.2 million in fees paid to the insurance
firm of the former board chairwoman and $155 thousand in
commissions paid to another trustee, whose advertising firm was
retained by the university without any bids.2 07 The case was settled
before trial, with the former president and trustees reimbursing
Adelphi for certain costs, but without any admissions of
wrongdoing."'
With this background, the following section explores the Penn
State case, with a focus on the role of the gubernatorial ex officio
trustee and the challenges associated with holding such trustee
accountable with respect to his or her fiduciary obligations.
VI. PENN STATE AND THE TROUBLESOME
MURKINESS OF THE GOVERNOR'S ROLE AS TRUSTEE
In 1855, the legislative creators of the Pennsylvania State
University, originally named "the Farmers' High School of
Pennsylvania," designed a corporation:
[The] trustees, and their successors in office, are hereby
elected and declared to be a body politic and corporate in
law, with perpetual succession, by the name, style and title of
the Farmers' High School of Pennsylvania, by which name
and title the said trustees, and their successors, shall be able
and capable in law to take by gift, grant, sale or conveyance,
by bequest, devise or otherwise, any estate in any lands,
tenements and hereditaments, goods, chattels or effects, and
at pleasure to alien or otherwise dispose of the same to and
for the uses and purposes of the said institution ....
The Governor of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania is an ex
officio member of the board. 2 10  "Ex officio" refers to a specific
method by which one becomes a member of a body: by the virtue of
holding another office.21 1 Accordingly, the title "ex officio" does not,
by itself, constitute a class of membership and entails no specific
rights or obligations. Bylaws can limit ex officio rights, such as
the attorney general's complaint).
207. See Bruce Lambert, State Sucs to Recover Funds Spent by Adelphis Ex-Trustecs, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 24, 1997, at B5.
208. See David Halbfinger, Lawsuits Over Ouster ofAdelphi ChieAre Settled, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 17, 1998, at B1.
209. 24 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2533 (2013).
210. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
211. See supra note 3.
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voting,212 but corporate documents may not reduce or absolve the
general fiduciary obligations of any of the members.213 While case
law is scarce in addressing ex officio fiduciary duties, the cases that do
acknowledge the title do not make a distinction between ex officio
and non-ex officio member duties or between voting and nonvoting
members.214
At Penn State, all members of the Board of Trustees "stand in a
fiduciary relationship to the University .... [They] shall act in good
faith, with due regard to the interests of the University, and shall
comply with the fiduciary principles of conduct hereinafter set
forth" 15 as well as "other federal or state reporting requirements." 2 16
Pennsylvania law also imposes specific fiduciary obligations on
nonprofit directors:
A director of a nonprofit corporation shall stand in a
fiduciary relation to the corporation and shall perform his
duties as a director . . . in good faith, in a manner he
reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the
corporation and with such care, including reasonable inquiry,
skill and diligence, as a person of ordinary prudence would
use under similar circumstances.
The law further requires that, in discharging their duties,
nonprofit directors consider the best interests of the corporation by
considering
the effects of any action upon any or all groups affected by
such action, including members, employees, suppliers,
customers and creditors of the corporation, and upon
communities in which offices or other establishments of the
corporation are located [and] [tjhe short-term and long-term
interests of the corporation, including benefits that may
accrue to the corporation from its long-term plans and the
possibility that these interests may be best served by the
212. Sec supra note 3.
213. Sce supra notes 82-4.
214. See, c.g., In re Spiegel, 292 B.R. 748, 749-51 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003) (highlighting the
existence of nonvoting ex officio members on a creditor's committee but noting that the
committee as a whole had fiduciary obligations toward the class of creditors it represented);
Memphis Health Ctr., Inc. v. Grant ,2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 498, at *31 (Tenn. Ct. App. July
28, 2006) (holding that a nonvoting ex officio member of the board of an incorporated nonprofit
health center was considered a "director" and had standing to maintain a derivative action
against the corporation).
215. PSU Bylaws, supra note 4, at § 8.07. The specific fiduciary duties imposed by the bylaws
primarily address the disclosure requirements of commercial relationships between the board
members and the university, the prohibition of information misuse, and abuse of gifts and
favors. Id. at §§ 8.07-8.09.
216. Id. at § 8.07.
217. 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5712 (2013).
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continued independence of the corporation.2 18
With respect to the enforcement of obligations, the state's
common law gives the Attorney General parens patriae powers to
supervise nonprofit corporations. 219 The state limits who has standing
to enforce nonprofit directorial obligations to the corporation itself as
well as to its members, as long as the purpose of the members' suit is
to invoke "the right of the corporation" rather than to obtain
individual relief.220
This section presents specific instances where the governor's
public duties as an elected official have come into conflict with his
duties as an ex officio corporate board member.
A. Ex OFFICIO CONFLICTS
1. The Sandusky Scandal
Jerry Sandusky, a retired former assistant football coach at Penn
State and the founder of The Second Mile, a charity he created
independent of Penn State in 1977 for underprivileged youth, 22 ' was
indicted by a Pennsylvania grand jury on November 4, 2011 for sex
crimes against underage boys.222 The indictment alleged that Mr.
Sandusky had molested the victims, all of whom he had met through
The Second Mile, during a period ranging from at least 1994 to 2009,
while he was assistant coach as well as after he had retired in 1999.223
On at least five occasions, the indictment alleged that the abuse had
taken place on Penn State premises, which Mr. Sandusky had access
to even after retirement.22 4 Mr. Sandusky's trial began on June 11,
2012.225 The jury reached its verdict on June 22, finding Mr. Sandusky
218. Id.
219. See, e.g., In re Milton Hershey Sch. Trust, 807 A.2d 324, 330 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002)
(recognizing the attorney general's Parons patriac powers in supervising charitable
organizations); Commonwealth v. Citizens Alliance for Better Neighborhoods, Inc., 983 A.2d
1274, 1277 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2009) (affirming attorney general standing to bring suit against a
nonprofit corporation by noting that "it is the well-settled law of the Commonwealth that the
Attorney General is responsible for the public supervision of charities through his parens
patriac powers").
220. 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5717 (2013).
221. Mark Vicra, Jo Becker, & Pete Thamel, Charity Founded by Accused Ex-Coach May
Fold, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19,2011, at D1.
222. See Viera, supra note 1.
223. Id.
224. FREEH SPORKIN & SULLIVAN LLP, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE
COUNSEL REGARDING THE ACrIONS OF THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY RELATED
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guilty of forty-five of the forty-eight charges.226 Mr. Sandusky was
sentenced to thirty to sixty years in prison later in the year.227
Governor Corbett's involvement with the Sandusky investigation
began prior to his gubernatorial duties, which commenced in January
of 2011. Mr. Corbett had been the state's attorney general for the six
years immediately preceding his inauguration as governor, and, in this
capacity, convened the grand jury investigation against Mr. Sandusky
in 2009.228 Due to grand jury secrecy laws, Mr. Corbett could not
disclose what he knew of the investigation to his fellow Penn State
trustees when he became an ex officio member of the board. As
Section B of this Part explores, the clash of legal principles, i.e., grand
jury confidentiality requirements versus fiduciary obligations of
disclosure, render the ex officio system susceptible to reassessment.
2. The State Budget Proposal
Unrelated to the scandal, Mr. Corbett's proposed annual budget
in March of 2011 had included cuts in state-supported higher
education by about fifty percent,229 significantly reducing state
funding granted to the fourteen universities of the state-owned
Pennsylvania State System of Higher Education ("PASSHE") 230 and
the four universities, including Penn State, that are members of the
state-related Commonwealth System of Higher Education
("CSHE").231 The governance structures of all eighteen universities
include some role for the Governor of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania. In the PASSHE system, the twenty-member Board of
Governors includes the Governor of Pennsylvania or a designee as a
voting member.232 At the CSHE universities, the governor is a
member of the four universities' respective boards of trustees.233 The
governor's 2011 proposed budget meant a $182 million decrease in
state aid to Penn State, approximately a fifty-two percent reduction
226. Joe Drape, Sandusky Guilty of Sexual Abuse of 10 Young Boys, N.Y. TIMES, June 23,
2012, at Al.
227. See Rohan, supra note 1.
228. Scc Becker, supra note 2.
229. See Chute & Schackner, supra note 8.
230. The Pennsylvania State System of Higher Education includes Bloomsburg University,
California University of Pennsylvania, Cheyncy University, Clarion University, East
Stroudsburg University, Edinboro University, Indiana University of Pennsylvania, Kutztown
University, Lock Haven University, Mansfield University, Millersville University, Shippensburg
University, Slippery Rock University, and West Chester University.
231. See supra section I.
232. Board of Governors, PA. ST. SYs. OF HIGHER EDUC., available at http://
www.passhe.edulinsidelbog/Pages/BOG-Home.aspx.
233. Sc supra notes 10, 11.
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from the preceding fiscal year.234 As the next section argues, the
budget proposal clearly breached basic tenants of fiduciary law,
providing yet another reason for the reassessment of the ex officio
gubernatorial trustee model.
B. ANALYSIS & RECOMMENDED ACTION
Under the duties of care and loyalty, nonprofit trustees must
reveal to the other members of the board important information that
may not be known to them.2 35 Such disclosure is not required,
however, if it would "violate a duty imposed by law, a legally
enforceable obligation of confidentiality, or a professional ethics
rule." 2 36 Accordingly, with respect to the Sandusky investigation, it is
clear that Mr. Corbett could not have legally informed the other
trustees of the investigation so that they could take appropriate action
to protect the university. But here is where the problem lies: Had
another, non-ex officio member of the board been privy to the
investigation, he or she could have simply resigned from the board in
order to avoid the conflicts intrinsic in being a silent fiduciary and
would have been replaced with relative ease. But, an ex officio
member at Penn State is required to serve on the board by law.237 As
such, he or she may not easily abandon the directorial obligations by
resignation.
Consequently, when an ex officio board member, gubernatorial
238or otherwise, is in a position where he or she is legally obliged to
conceal from the other trustees information that may adversely affect
the corporation, the law must mandate that the member divulge such
conflict to a court, which may in turn appoint a new trustee who
would serve until the matter has come to a close, so as to not rob the
institution of competent governance by being, in essence, a board
member short. After all, how well can the institution be served if one
of its trustees is in a position that requires the trustee to conceal
detrimental information from it?
On the budget cut issue, there is very little the law can do, save
for a severe but rational measure, to remove statutorily the governor
as an ex officio member of the board. This proposal is based on the
following assessment: There is no question that the governor of the
234. Sec Chute & Schackner, supra note 8.
235. MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. Acr § 8.30(c) (2008).
236. Id.
237. See supra note 4.
238. At Penn State, for instance, Pennsylvania's Secretaries of Education, Agriculture,
Environmental Resources, and the president of the university also serve as ex officio trustees.
PSU Charter, supra note 4, at C-2.
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state is entitled to propose a budget that highlights gubernatorial
preferences, including proposals that request the reduction of the
state's assistance to certain corporations. But what if the governor
sits on the boards of those very corporations as their fiduciary?
Fiduciary law imposes a duty of loyalty upon all trustees,
including ex officio gubernatorial directors, requiring them to pursue
the best interests of the corporations at which they serve. 239 The duty
mandates that a trustee refrain from actions that may harm the
corporation, take affirmative steps to protect the corporation, 24() and
do so with undivided loyalties.2 4  Doing otherwise would constitute
the abdication and dereliction of duties. But if breach of the duty of
loyalty is alleged against a governor-trustee, in the context of a
gubernatorial proposal to cut a corporation's budget, the action
would likely be summarily dismissed through the invocation of
sovereign immunity as an affirmative defense. In effect, the status
quo permits a specific trustee to legally undermine an institution at
which he serves, without any consequences whatsoever. This makes
for bad public policy in need of transformation.
VII. CONCLUSION
When Mr. Corbett was asked how he viewed his role as a Penn State
trustee, he responded: "I'm the governor . . . . I believe I have
perspective on behalf of the taxpayers of Pennsylvania to share with
the board."2 43 This is a serious misunderstanding of a fiduciary's role
and presents a fundamental conundrum. Pennsylvania law appoints
the governor as an ex officio member of the board. It does not carve
out an exception regarding his fiduciary obligations toward the
university. Neither does it say that the governor is on the board to
represent the state. As such, the default obligations of a fiduciary, as
defined by the state's nonprofit corporation law, prevail. It is, in fact,
telling that in the minutes of the meetings of Penn State's Board of
Trustees, Mr. Corbett is referred to as "Trustee Corbett" and not
"Governor." 244  The ex officio directors, along with the other
members of the board, are there to safeguard the institution's
interests and no other's.
239. See KURTZ, supra note 89.
240. See Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (1939).
241. See WORMSER, supra note 103, at 125-30.
242. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 8521-8528 (Pennsylvania's sovereign immunity statute).
243. Andrew McGill & John L. Micek, Corbett not Afraid to Exercise Muscle on Penn State
Board, THE MORNING CALL (Feb. 13, 2012), http://articles.mcall.comi2Ol2-02-13/news/mc-penn-
state-corbett-trustee-20120211 1 state-president-rodney-erickson-tom-corbett-board-meeting.
244. See BD. OF TRS., Mins. of mtgs. at 260-10 (Jan. 20, 2012), available at
http://www.psu.edultrustees/pdf/january2012minutesbot.pdf.
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There is no question that the state's public interests should trump
an institution's "private" interests. But it is the state that has
chartered the corporation for the promotion of a public good
(education) and has appointed the governor as one of its trustees to
guard the institution's best interests as a fiduciary. Accordingly, if the
ex officio director is in a position where he may not be able to serve
the corporation's interests, the law must mandate that the fiduciary
step down from the board. The law should even consider abolishing
the gubernatorial-trustee model altogether, because a governor's
political objectives may not be in line with what is in the interest of
the corporation at which he serves as trustee. The constant tensions
that the current paradigm condones, those between public
governance political objectives and private corporate governance
principles as defined by centuries of fiduciary law, cannot be
sustained.
This is not to say that there are no benefits to the gubernatorial-
trustee model. There are. "Even a governor who rarely attends
board meetings . . . can be helpful in many ways . . . fending off ill-
considered legislative incursions, attracting national figures to the
campus, and intervening with federal officials." 245  But if the
gubernatorial trustee believes that his service on the board means
representing the will of the state's citizens and not the best interests
of the university, the university has essentially been robbed of an
effective trustee. As a former university president once noted,
"responsibility to a constituency is inconsistent with sound
management,"246 an apt summary of the gubernatorial trustee
conundrum.
245. Freedman, supra note 34, at 11.
246. Id. at 14.
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